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SWEEPING THE MESS UNDER HANFORD'S RUG:
How THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AND ITS CITIZENS
GROUPS PLAN TO CLEAN IT UP
SHANNON E. WEST*
"Initiative 297 is the prescription to Protect Washington."'
INTRODUCTION
The land, air, and water surrounding the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation ("Hanford Site") is consumed with a disease called
indifference. In response to that indifference, citizens groups in the
State of Washington drafted Initiative 297 ("1-297"), deciding to
act in accordance with an old but true work ethic: "If you want
something done right, you have to do it yourself." It has not been
nor will it be, however, an easy road to try to make 1-297 into the
Cleanup Priority Act,2 a Washington State law that would stop the
Hanford Site from continuing to exist as the nation's radioactive
waste dump.3
Washington House Speaker Frank Chopp, a Democrat from
Seattle, was asked recently about the legislature's response to the
* Ms. West is a 2005 J.D. candidate at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the
College of William and Mary, and received her B.A. in Government and English
from the University of Notre Dame in 2002. This Note is dedicated to Ms. West's
parents, Chet and Jeanne West, and her sister, Kelly West, whose unconditional
love, faith, and generosity have taught her to always follow her heart and
believe in herself. She is grateful to Taisa Welhasch for inspiring her to write
about this topic, and to the Editorial Board of the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review, whose tireless efforts made this Note
possible. Ms. West would like to especially thank Seamus West, whose love and
support helped her to survive her last year of law school.
1 Press Release, Heart of America Northwest, Initiative 297 to Stop National
Radioactive Waste Dump Filed Today with Record Number of Signatures (Jan.
2, 2004) (quoting Dr. Jim Trimbold of Washington Physicians for Social
Responsibility), available at http://www.heartofamericanorthwest.org/newsre
leases/newsrelease_104.doc [hereinafter National Radioactive Waste Dump].
2 Cleanup Priority Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105E (2004).
3 National Radioactive Waste Dump, supra note 1.
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submission of 1-297 for its review. Chopp stated in a weekly media
briefing, "I would say 'no action, let the voters decide."'4 "No action"
has been and continues to be the motto of the Bush administration,
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the United
States Department of Energy ("USDOE") in dealing with the
Hanford Site, the "nation's most contaminated area. '
Over the past fifty-five years, residents in the Hanford Site
area should have known that USDOE never cared about their
health or safety. They had a right to know that USDOE was
dumping radioactive and hazardous waste into unlined trenches,
an action that contaminated the groundwater in the surrounding
area.' The citizens of Washington also had a right to know that
USDOE would never fulfill any of its promises for remediation of
the Hanford Site.7
This Note examines how the Bush administration and
USDOE's attempt to transport more deadly radioactive waste to
the Hanford Site, without any environmental remediation for the
waste already there, forced the State of Washington to take action
in its own defense by filing 1-297. In particular, this Note focuses
on the incompetence of USDOE in neglecting to fulfill any of its
promises to clean up the Hanford Site. It also examines 1-297's
superior remediation plan for Hanford and the process by which it
was passed with overwhelming support by Washington voters on
the November 2004 general election ballot.
4 Under the Dome: Initiatives, OLYMPIAN, Feb. 5, 2004, at 2B (discussing the
option lawmakers had after 1-297's submission to the legislature).
' Gerald Pollet, Hanford: Toxic Deals and the Columbia River-Locke Ad-
ministration Negotiated with U.S. Department of Energy to Add Waste, and
Avoid Cleanup, LOCKE'S LEGACY: WATER CRISIS (Sierra Club, Seattle, Wash.),
Fall 2003, at 29, available at http://www.waterplanet.ws/watercrisis/pdf/.
6 John M. Whiteley, The Hanford Nuclear Reservation: The Old Realities and the
New, in CRITICAL MASSES: CITIZENS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 44-48 (Russell
J. Dalton et al. eds., 1999) (outlining failures of safety management at the
Hanford Site). Hanford's operators dispensed byproducts of the plutonium ex-
traction process straight into the soil. Id.
' See Pollet, supra note 5; MICHELE S. GERBER, ON THE HOME FRONT: THE COLD
WAR LEGACY OF THE HANFORD NUCLEAR SITE 67 (1992).
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In order to provide a foundation for understanding the issues
at the Hanford Site, Part I describes the history of Hanford and
how it is regulated by the government. After describing the
regulatory controls over the Hanford Site, Part II examines the
deceit and gross negligence with which the Hanford Site has been
operated. Part III follows this examination and describes how
Washington's citizens groups began to fight back against the Bush
administration by opposing USDOE's plan to redefine the waste at
Hanford so it could ignore deadly radioactive materials presently
at the Hanford Site. Part IV inspects the lawsuit filed against
USDOE for attempting to import 70,000 more truckloads of
radioactive waste to Hanford before cleaning up the waste that is
still there. Finally, Part V examines the aspects of 1-297 that make
it a superior remediation program at the Hanford Site and the vote
that made 1-297 a reality.
Heart of America Northwest ("HANW"), the Government
Accountability Project ("GAP"), and countless citizens groups,
churches, and social clubs believe that 1-297 is the only way to save
the area around the Hanford Site from becoming a nuclear
wasteland. The executive director of HANW, Gerald Pollet, stated
that "[tihe Bush administration has declared nuclear war on
Washington state. We have to increase the tools we have to stop
our state from becoming a national radioactive waste dump."'
1-297 is the tool that the citizens groups of Washington have
chosen to take back control of their health and safety.
I. HISTORY OF THE HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION SITE
A. Location and Use
Located in Eastern Washington, the Hanford Site runs along
fifty-one miles of the Columbia River and is accepted as the
country's most dangerous industrial facility.9 Comprised of 560
8 Karen Dome Steele, Citizens File Initiative to Stop Hanford Plan: Measure
Would Forbid New Waste Imports Until Current Contents Cleaned, SPOKESMAN-
REV., June 10, 2003, at B1.
9 Pollet, supra note 5, at 29.
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square miles of desert, the Hanford Site is approximately the same
size as Rhode Island.° Beginning in 1944, the Hanford Reservation
was used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons by way of
nuclear reactors that existed on the side of the river.1 The stretch
of the Columbia River that runs along the Hanford Site passes
"nine massive Plutonium production reactors used for nuclear
weapons production that discharged their highly contaminated
cooling water directly into the River or into long trenches alongside
the River." 2
In the beginning of 1943, General Leslie Groves, the director
of the Manhattan Project, 13 wanted a location to build the first
nuclear reactor in the world. 14 Groves chose Hanford as the site. 5
It was the ideal location in Groves' opinion because the Colum-
bia River dams produced adequate water and electricity, and the
land possessed "sufficient isolation that nuclear accidents were
regarded as tolerable." 6 On August 9, 1945, two years after the
10 Lynn Porter, Introduction to Hanford Issues, Hanford Watch, at http://www.
hanfordwatch.org/introduction.htm (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Porter, Hanford
Issues].
11Id.
12 Pollet, supra note 5, at 29.
13 MICHAEL D'ANTONIO, ATOMIC HARVEST, HANFORD AND THE LETHAL TOLL OF
AMERICA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL 10 (1993). "Hanford had been a vital part of the
famous Manhattan Project, which has made the world's first bomb-grade
plutonium, the very plutonium that powered Fat Man, the five-ton atomic bomb
that exploded over Nagasaki. .. ." Id.
14 Robert Alvarez, The Legacy of Hanford, THE NATION, Aug. 18, 2003, at 31-35,
available at http://www.hanfordwatch.org/archive/Legacy-ofHanford.htm.
15 Id.
16 Id.; see also Riley E. Dunlap et al., Local Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository at Hanford, Washington, in PUBLIC REACTIONS TO
NUCLEAR WASTE: CITIZENS' VIEWS OF REPOSITORY SITING 137 (Riley E. Dunlap
et al. eds., 1993). The Columbia River, the longest river in North America to end
in the Pacific Ocean, was beneficial to Hanford's plutonium production for many
reasons. The "single-pass reactors" at Hanford pumped cooling water first into
their reactor cores and then immediately back into the river; the Columbia River
was able to supply the extensive amount of water needed to cool the reactors.
The large dams of the Columbia River additionally provided the Hanford Site
with the massive amounts of electricity needed to power it. Furthermore, the
area surrounding the Hanford Site was secluded, making it "attractive for
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commencement of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, the Japanese
city of Nagasaki was destroyed by the plutonium made from the
Hanford "B" reactor.' 7
The land surrounding the Hanford Site, once rich with
agriculture and biodiversity, was forever changed by the Hanford
Site's creation.
Several Indian tribes wandered and foraged this
land, and 6,000 farmers from the towns of Hanford,
Richland, and White Bluffs grew fruit in orchards
irrigated from the Columbia. But after the Man-
hattan Project expropriated 570 square miles of land
in 1943, plutonium and its lasting legacy, nuclear
waste, became Hanford's crop, forever altering its
land.i"
Since World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington, the
Idaho Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Idaho, and
the Savannah River Site in South Carolina have been the three
main sites used to store high-level waste ("HLW") produced from
reprocessing spent fuel to extract material for plutonium- and
uranium-based weapons.' 9 Between 1944 and the late 1980s,
military production purposes. There were few people to relocate, few eyes, ears,
and lips to compromise the high degree of secrecy that needed to be maintained,
and few potential casualties in the event of an accident." Id. (internal citation
omitted).
17 Alvarez, supra note 14.
18 Whiteley, supra note 6, at 29 (quoting Karen Dome Steele); see also William
Schreckhise, The Development of Interest Group Activism at Hanford, in
CRITICAL MASSES: CITIZENS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 29 (Russell J.
Dalton et al. eds., 1999). Karen Dorn Steele has been a reporter for the
Spokesman-Review since the late 1980s. Her journalistic efforts prompted the
full and timely disclosure of Hanford documents in 1986. Id.
'9 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR WASTE: CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING
POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN DOE's HIGH-LEVEL WASTE CLEANUP PROGRAM 5-6, GAO-
03-593 (June 17, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03593.pdf
[hereinafter NUCLEAR WASTE]. "About 94 million gallons of untreated high-level
waste is stored at DOE facilities at Hanford, Washington; Savannah River,
81120051
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nuclear reactors located along the Columbia River continued to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.2 ° Yet, many of the tanks
built at the Hanford Site were designed to last only ten to forty
years.2 '
Producing plutonium has caused the Hanford Site to become
"the world's largest environmental cleanup project," possessing
"several hundred thousand metric tons of radioactive and
hazardous waste."22
B. Ownership and Regulatory Powers
The federal government owns the Hanford reservation, which
is managed by USDOE. 2' However, Washington owns its ground
and surface waters, thus possessing "the groundwater beneath the
Hanford Site, the Columbia River, and all ground and surface
waters within the State over or through which DOE must
transport the radioactive and hazardous transuranic wastes."24
South Carolina; and near Idaho Falls, Idaho-primarily in underground tanks.
This waste would fill an area the size of a football field to a depth of about 260
feet." Id. at 1.
20 Porter, Hanford Issues, supra note 10. The process of producing plutonium
involves two main processes. In a plutonium production reactor, uranium metal
is irradiated. At a chemical separations plant, spent nuclear fuel cools and is
treated. Plutonium is then separated from the uranium and other radioactive
by-products. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS: EPA
REGION 10 NEEDS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES AT
THE HANFORD SUPERFUND 100-K AREA, Rep. No. 2003-P-00002, at 2 (Nov. 4,
2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2002/hanford.pdf [hereinafter
FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS]. In order to extract plutonium, spent rods from the
nuclear reactors are dissolved in nitric acid, resulting in the generation of
massive amounts of highly radioactive and chemical waste. Porter, Hanford
Issues, supra note 10.
21 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 6 (stating that "[miost of [the] tanks...
have already exceeded their design life.").
22 FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS, supra note 20, at 2.
23 id.
24 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v. Spencer
Abraham et al., No. CT-03-5018-AAM (E.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2003), at 3, at http://
www.atg.wa.gov/hanford/documents/nov2004/March%202003%20Complaint.pdf
[hereinafter Complaint].
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USDOE's regulatory powers are shared with EPA and the
Washington Department of Ecology ("WDOE"), a state agency,
because the Hanford Nuclear Reservation is subject to both federal
and state environmental laws.
C. Governing Statutes and Agencies
Federal laws govern the treatment and disposal of HLW at the
Hanford Site. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA")26
was enacted to dispose of HLW27 and spent fuel through the
creation and development of a separate repository-a "permanent
deep disposal system."28 Under the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), 29 EPA is required to conduct hazar-
dous release reporting and cleanup programs.3 ° "EPA's goal.., is
to select cleanup remedies that are protective of human health and
the environment, maintain protection over time, and minimize
untreated waste" as set forth in the National Contingency Plan(,,NCP,,). 3
In Washington, the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and
Consent Order ("FFACO") was established after negotiations
coordinated FFACO under CERCLA, a Consent Order under the
25 See GERBER, supra note 7, at 210 (discussing the Tri-Party Agreement ("TPA")
between the U.S. Department of Energy ("USDOE"), EPA, and the Washington
Department of Ecology ("WDOE")).
26 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (2000).
27 "High-level waste contains radioactive components that emit dangerously
intense radiation." NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 5. USDOE may seek
clarification of its authority to determine which radioactive waste should be
managed as HLW. Id. at 4-5.
28 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 8.
29 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2000).
30 FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS, supra note 20, at 4.
311d. In establishing the procedures and regulations for CERCLA cleanup efforts
under NCP, the choice of remedy shall be contingent "on whether it provides
overall protection of human health and the environment; compliance with
Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements; long term effectiveness
and permanence; reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume through treatment;
implementability, including technical feasibility; and cost effectiveness." Id.
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Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and Washing-
ton's Hazardous Waste Act.32 FFACO mandates that USDOE
institute cleanup programs at existing sites.33 FFACO is also
supposed to "establish a framework and schedule for implemen-
ting response actions in accordance with CERCLA, including
milestones."34
In addition to other federal and state hazardous waste laws,
Washington created the Model Toxics Control Act ("MTCA").3
MTCA assures the citizens of Washington remediation standards
that will shield people from being exposed to cancer, where the risk
of cancer is more than one in 100,000.36 Also, unless cleanup is
completely unattainable, MTCA standards provide that the clean-
up should be adequate enough for unrestricted use by the public.3"
Perhaps the most influential agreement came about when
USDOE, EPA, and WDOE created the Tri-Party Agreement
("TPA") in 1989.38 A comprehensive environmental cleanup prog-
ram, TPA establishes that 99% of the waste that exists in HLW
tanks will be extracted. 9
Unfortunately, the appropriate remedy for the removal of 99%
of the nuclear waste at the Hanford Site is not yet available.4 °
32Id.
33
Id.
" Id. at 8. Under this agreement, EPA is required to enforce "FFACO mile-
stones. In the event the DOE fails to comply with a term or condition of the
FFACO, a stipulated penalty may be assessed in an amount up to $5,000 for the
first week and up to $10,000 for each additional week of noncompliance."
FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS, supra note 20, at 9.35 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D (West 2005).
36 Pollet, supra note 5, at 29.
3 7
Id.
38 See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 7, at 210; Pollet, supra note 5; Porter, Hanford
Issues, supra note 10. Negotiated and amended multiple times since its inception
in 1989, TPA is comprised of target dates to complete specific cleanup goals,
referred to as enforceable "milestones." Id.
" Marc Fioravanti & Arjun Makhijani, Containing the Cold War Mess, Institute
for Energy & Environmental Research, available at http://www.ieer.orgfreports/
cleanup/summary.html (Oct. 1997) (discussing the management of tanks con-
taining high-level waste).
4 0
Id.
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Therefore, the 99% removal goal is "arbitrary and environmentally
unsound;"41 the remaining 1% of the waste volume in these HLW
tanks will probably consist of millions of curies of radioactivity
because USDOE's solutions are not related to stopping current
risks or extended management of the waste.
TPA also creates problems of authority by creating "dual
coverage," placing the Hanford Site "under the jurisdiction of
several environmental statutes .... Because of the way the TPA
applies regulations to Hanford, any site that has both active and
inactive hazardous-waste-producing components is technically
covered by both RCRA and Superfund."43 Therefore, both the State
of Washington and USDOE have regulatory powers at Hanford.
II. "DOWNWINDERS" AND DECEPTION
A. HEDR: "Downwinders" Fight Back
In response to pressure from the public, USDOE esta-
blished the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project
("HEDR").' Supervised by the Center for Disease Control ("CDC"),
HEDR's purpose "was to estimate and reconstruct all radionuclide
emissions from Hanford from 1944 to 1972, in order to ascertain
whether neighboring individuals and animals had been exposed to
harmful doses of radiation."
45
USDOE now acknowledges that over 1 million gallons ofwaste
have been unintentionally leaked from the Hanford Site.4" The
creation of HEDR also pressured USDOE to admit that between
41 Id.
42 Id.
4' Glenn Zorpette, Hanford's Nuclear Wasteland, SCI. AM., May 1996, at 96.
4 Dunlap et al., supra note 16, at 139.451 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 292 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims before
discovery reached the phase of individual causation, finding plaintiffs were
correct in their understanding of generic causation, and concluding plaintiffs'
case was prejudiced by district court's delayed decision requiring them to satisfy
precise threshold dose levels of exposure).46 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 6 n.3.
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1946 and 1966 approximately 121 million gallons of deadly
radioactive waste was intentionally released from the Hanford
Site; the radioactive waste was deposited directly into the soil
because Hanford lacked available tank space.47 Jack Geiger, a
medical professor who worked as part of a task force for the
Physicians for Social Responsibility, noted that the most incon-
ceivable aspect of USDOE's deception was that
the government's suppression of the information for
four decades.... compares unfavorably to that of the
devastating nuclear releases at the Chernobyl plant
in the Soviet Union. Chernobyl released more
radioactivity, but.., its cover-up lasted a few weeks,
while Hanford's went on for four decades. . .
"Chernobyl was an accident. Hanford was deliberate.
Chernobyl was a singular event, the product of faulty
reactor design and human error. Hanford was a
chronic event, the product of obsessive secrecy and
callous indifference to public health."
48
HEDR released information that "[iln 1945 alone '345,000
curies of radioiodine (- 13 1), generated by the chemical separation
of plutonium from the irradiated fuel rods, was released into the
atmosphere.' 49 This contaminated gas spread throughout Eastern
41 Comments on Revised Draft: Hanford Solid Waste (Radioactive and Ha-
zardous) Waste Program Environmental Impact Statement (RD-HSWEIS) to the
U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE), Heart of America Northwest Research
Center, at 3, at http://www.heartofamericanorthwest.org/reportspubs/hsweis-
comments_03.doc (June 10, 2003) [hereinafter RD-HSWEIS]; see also NUCLEAR
WASTE, supra note 19, at 6 n.3.
48 SETH SHULMAN, THE THREAT AT HOME: CONFRONTING THE Toxic LEGACY OF
THE U.S. MILITARY 98-99 (1992) (quoting Jack Geiger, medical professor at the
City University of New York Medical School).
'9 Craig A. Barr, A Practical Guide to Proving and Disproving Causation in
Radiation Exposure Cases: Hanford Nuclear Site and Radioactive Iodine, 31
GONZ. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996). Covering a 75,000 square mile area, emissions at the
Hanford Site were examined using computer models and algorithms to
approximate the occurrence and frequency of radionuclide releases into the air
and water of the Columbia River. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292 F.3d
at 1128.
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Washington and contaminated both vegetation and cattle.50 From
1952 to 1954, radioaruthenium (Ru-103 Nru-106) was also dis-
pensed into the atmosphere. 51
In 1990, HEDR's report, Initial Hanford Radiation Dose
Estimates,5 2 informed the public of the massive amounts of
radioactive and non-radioactive materials that had been released
from Hanford since the 1940s.13 The report determined that iodine-
131 had mobilized downwind from Hanford and contaminated the
grass.54 Cows grazed on this contaminated grass and, as a result,
produced milk that contained radiation.55 Approximately 13,500
people were significantly exposed to radiation by drinking milk
from the affected cows.
56
From these 13,500 people exposed to radiation, a group of Tri-
Cities residents formed a coalition called the "Downwinders." 7 The
Downwinders claimed that local families were afflicted with
serious illnesses, including thyroid cancer, as a result of the
Hanford Site's activities.5" The illnesses occurring around the
Hanford Site were disproportionate, and the cause of the illnesses
was thought to be from the hazardous releases at the Site.59 The
Downwinders believed that releases were intentional and massive
when the Hanford Site was first in existence, but that the releases
still occurred in smaller amounts due to the inadequate radioactive
containers used at the Hanford Site.60
" Barr, supra note 49, at 1, 3.
51 Id.
52 Gerald F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated Place in the
United States, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 165, 180 (1996).
53 Id.
54 Id.
5 5
Id.
56Id.
" Dunlap et al., supra note 16, at 139. "'Downwinders' accumulated doses in
excess of thirty-three rads." Hess, supra note 52, at 180. Unfortunately, children
suffered the highest doses, with 1200 children accumulating more than 650 rads.
"[T]he current EPA standard for airborne radiation is 0.025 rads per year." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60Id.
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HEDR's report "sparked a blaze of litigation."6 Thousands of
individual plaintiffs filed complaints in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington, alleging various illnesses
resulting from the radioactive emissions at the Hanford Site.
6 2
Plaintiffs alleged that five companies under contract with the
United States had intentionally or negligently operated the
Hanford Site.63 Between 1943 and 1987, defendants E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Company, General Electric Company, UNC Nuclear
Industries, Inc., Atlantic Richfield Company, and Rockwell In-
ternational Corporation all acquired license agreements with the
federal government to operate the Hanford Site.' Plaintiffs claim-
ed that the intentional or negligent emissions and exposure to
radioactive waste from the Hanford Site proximately caused
personal injury and property damage.65 Certain plaintiffs pro-
ceeded individually in a consolidated complaint after the district
court delayed class certification.6 6
Defining the "generic causation" standard necessary to prove
liability became the central issue in the case.67 Plaintiffs claimed
they only had to prove that the radiation emissions from the
Hanford Site had the potential effect of rendering the illnesses
claimed by the plaintiffs.6 s Defendants insisted that the "doubling
dose" standard be applied-plaintiffs would have to show that they
61 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292 F.3d at 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 See generally In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18091
(E.D. Wash. 1998).
63 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 292 F.3d at 1127.
4 Id.
5 Id. Plaintiffs brought causes of action for "negligence, strict liability, trespass,
nuisance, misrepresentation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful death, and conspiracy." Id. In addition, plaintiffs sought
damages and remedies, including "compensatory damages for physical,
emotional, and economic harm, punitive damages, medical monitoring,
compelled disclosure of all relevant information, and abatement and remediation
of ongoing and threatened releases of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous
substances." Id. at 1128-29.
66 Id. at 1128.
67 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 292 F.3d at 1130.
" Id.; see also Barr, supra note 49, at 16 (identifying "[tihe criteria which epide-
miologists use to determine whether causation has been established").
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had been "exposed to a specific dose of radiation that statistically
'doubled their risk' of harm." 9 The defendants additionally alleged
that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that it was more probable than not the specific ailments from
which they suffered were caused by the toxic emissions at the
Hanford Site.7 ° The district court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment.71 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, reversed and remanded the district
court's decision, "holding that the 'doubling of the risk' standard
used by the district court was erroneous." 2 One issue that swayed
the Ninth Circuit was that even a small amount of radiation
released from the Hanford Site could have undeniably produced
the wide array of illnesses that the plaintiffs were suffering with.73
B. Uncovering the Deception: Human Radiation Experiments
The Downwinders absorbed the iodine-131 into their bodies,
most likely into their thyroid glands.74 When the Hanford Site was
69 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292 F.3d at 1130; see also Barr, supra note
41, at 13 (explaining the calculation of the "double dose" standard).70 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292 F.3d at 1130. Defendants argued that
the specific ailments were also present in humans in an unexposed atmosphere
outside of the Hanford radius. Id.
71 Id. at 1131. The district court agreed with the test established in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), and stated
that to show "generic causation, each individual plaintiff had to prove not only
that radiation is capable of causing injury, but that he or she had been exposed
to a threshold dose of radiation that statistically doubled the risk of harm over
the risk that exists for the general population." Id. at 1131.72 V. Thomas Meador III et al., Anti-Toxins: Defense Counsel in Mass Toxic Tort
Cases Can Frequently Prevail by Challenging Plaintiffs' Proof of Both General
and Specific Causation, 26 L.A. LAWYER 33, 38, July/Aug. 2003; see also In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292 F.3d at 1135 (stating that "the district court
should not have ventured into individual determinations at this stage of
discovery when there had not been full disclosure of individual plaintiffs
circumstances").
13 Meador III et al., supra note 72, at 38.
74 Hess, supra note 52, at 180; see also In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 292
F.3d at 1128 ("The HEDR concluded that 1-131 emissions peaked during the
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created, some effects of iodine, both radioactive and stable, were
known.75 Around 1948, Collier's reported that, "[t]he thyroid cannot
distinguish between ordinary iodine and radioactive iodine... the
thyroid... commits suicide when it accepts radioactive iodine. 76
Approximately 400 billion gallons of radioactive iodine were
directly deposited into the soil at the Hanford Site.77 Yet, the
Atomic Energy Commission kept this information from the public,
praising the environmental conditions at the Hanford Site by
stating that "[m]inute quantities of radioactive contamination in
air, vegetation, soil, surface water, and groundwater are detected
by radio-chemical means ... All radioactive materials routinely
detected beyond the plan perimeter are at or below one-tenth of the
maximum permissible limits."
s7
In December 1993, the U.S. government was exposed as
USDOE Secretary Hazel O'Leary allowed the public, for the first
time, to view "terrifying, previously secret United States govern-
ment documents that verified our government purposely and
repeatedly exposed citizens to radioactive fallout to determine the
extent of any health effects."79
President Clinton's Executive Order 12,891 subsequently esta-
blished an Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments
period from 1944 to 1946, when an estimated 88% (685,000 curies) of Hanford's
total iodine emissions occurred."); Alvarez, supra note 14.
75 GERBER, supra note 7, at 84.
7 1 Id. The Atomic Energy Commission determined from unclassified reports that
the thyroid gland picks up and utilizes nearly all of the iodine in
the human system, normally about 80 times as much as any
other tissue ... Special fission-made iodine [1-131] ... can...
destroy human thyroid tissue, if it can get at it. Since it is
attracted to thyroid tissue, it can be used to destroy it, whether
or not it is diseased.
Id. (citations omitted).77 Alvarez, supra note 14 (claiming this staggering amount would be enough to
form a contaminated lake that could submerge Manhattan to a depth of over
eighty feet).
78 Whiteley, supra note 6, at 37.
" Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site,
and Judgment at Nuremberg, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 147, 149 (1995).
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("ACHRE"). 8 ° The Executive Order defined "human radiation expe-
riments" as "(1) [E] xperiments on individuals involving intentional
exposure to ionizing radiation .... (2) [E]xperiments involving
intentional environmental releases of radiation that (A) were
designed to test human health effects of ionizing radiation; or (B)
were designed to test the extent of human exposure to ionizing
radiation.""'
The principal function of ACHRE was to identify files pertai-
ning to the Cold War and make those files accessible to the general
public.8 2 ACHRE's final report was released in October 1995, pro-
viding recommendations for government action and suggestions for
remedies.83
Thyroid cancer and other forms of thyroid damages are just
some of the illnesses linked to radioactive iodine. USDOE con-
ducted a Qualitative Risk Assessment in 1994, identifying the
presence of hexavalent chromium at the Hanford Site.84 Over ten
years later, hexavalent chromium continues to seep into the
Columbia River. 5 The levels of hexavalent chromium at Hanford
surpass Washington's Chronic Ambient Water Quality Standard
for the Protection of Freshwater Aquatic Life for the pollutant.8 6
USDOE, instead of attempting to remedy the pollution of the
Columbia River, has merely identified the wildlife that will be
affected.
Potential ecological receptors along the Hanford
Reach of the Columbia River, where the groundwater
80 Id.
81 Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,891, 59 Fed. Reg. 2935 (Jan. 15, 1994).
82 Schroeter, supra note 79, at 150.
83 Id.
84 FEDERAL FACILITY CLEANUPS, supra note 20, at 21. This assessment revealed
the presence of hexavalent chromium could result in terrible consequences for
the environment, which would need a cleanup measure in place. As a metallic
element, when chromium is converted to its hexavalent form, it can easily be
dissolved in water, enabling the hexavalent chromium to move throughout rivers
and lakes with ease. See id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
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from the 100-KR-4 Operable Unit discharges, include
fish and other organisms that live and spawn in the
river, on the river bottom, and along the shoreline;
birds and other animals that use the river and
adjacent wetlands; and predators, such as the herons,
that consume aquatic organisms. Receptors may
come in contact with chromium-contaminated
groundwater as it discharges into and mixes with
water in the river, or as it issues from the riverbank
seepage before flowing into the river."
In 2002, levels of carbon tetrachloride were calculated in the
vapor of one of Hanford's burial ground trenches."8 The amount of
carbon tetrachloride in the trenches surpassed the smallest lethal
amount in the atmosphere for people by 176 percent.8 9
Instead of enacting remedial measures to deal with this
obvious risk to human health, USDOE expanded the use of burial
ground trenches for imported waste from other nuclear weapons
complex sites.9 ° The burial ground trenches contain unknown
hazardous substances and are subject to state and federal hazar-
dous waste laws. More than ten years ago, Washington banned the
expansion or construction of new unlined trenches.9 It is therefore
illegal for USDOE to expand these trenches and add new ones.
These are only some of Hanford's disturbing and deadly
substances that could potentially leak and harm humans and the
87 Id. at 22.
8 Pollet, supra note 5, at 30. Carbon Tetrachloride is a "poison, carcinogen, and
reproductive toxin." Id.
89 Id.
'0 Id.; see also RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 1. However, USDOE repeatedly
ignores the law and expands these trenches, many of which are over 1000 feet.
For example, in 1997, USDOE expanded a trench that was already 1160 feet
long. USDOE did not give a second glance to its illegal actions. Pollet, supra note
5, at 30.
9 1RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 31.
2Id.; see also Pollet, supra note 5, at 30. "Ecology's Director Tom Fitzsimmons
has refused to require a full MTCA investigation of the releases, and said that
he committed to USDOE to allow continued use of the trenches." Id.
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environment. A scientist with USDOE's Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, Timothy Jarvis, believes enough contami-
nated materials have been dumped at the Hanford Site to have
"the potential to induce cancer in every person currently on the
planet, 208 million times over."93
IV. USDOE RECLASSIFICATION SCHEME
A. The Bush Budget: Speeding Up Disaster
The Bush administration has continuously cut corners and
ignored safety considerations since George W. Bush was elected
President in 2000. In the first two years of his first term, President
Bush's proposed fiscal budget dramatically cut spending desi-
gnated for the cleanup of the Hanford Site.94 HANW responded
that the cutbacks would cause "the U.S. Department of Energy,
which runs Hanford, . . . [to fall] $235 million short of what
Department of Energy budget documents claimed would be the
amount required to fund all essential safety and cleanup work
required next year by the Hanford Clean-Up Agreement and
environmental laws."95
In 2002, Washington State officials calculated that approxi-
mately $1.7 billion was needed from the federal government in
order for the cleanup at Hanford to stay on track.96 In early March
9 Alvarez, supra note 14.
14 Press Release, Heart of America Northwest, Bush Budget Cuts Nuclear Waste
Clean-Up: Budget is a Whopping $235 Million Short for Essential Safety and
Clean-Up Work Required By the Hanford Clean-Up Agreement and Environ-
mental Laws in 2002 (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.heartofamerica northwest.
org/newsreleases/release041001.html [hereinafter Bush Budget Press Release];
see also In Our View: Watch Hanford; If We Let Down Our Guard, Cleanup Will
Almost Certainly be Shortchanged, COLUMBIAN, Nov. 23, 2003, at C10.
9 Bush Budget Press Release, supra note 94.
96 Editorial, Keep Promises; Don't Shortchange Hanford, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at B6 [hereinafter Keep Promises]. "The estimate assumes spending
approximately $1 billion for the Office of River Protection, which handles
Hanford's crud-filled and leaking tanks, and the vitrification project to turn
radioactive waste into manageable glass blocks. The balance would be spent
on the rest of Richland cleanup operations." Id.
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2002, USDOE, WDOE, and EPA agreed to cut $30 billion from the
cleanup cost of Hanford and deduct 35 years off the projected
cleanup date in the process."
The Bush administration attempted to pacify Washington's
citizens by promising $150 million more to the Hanford Site and
projecting that the cleanup at Hanford would be completed as early
as 2025.98 In response, Washington Governor Gary Locke relied
solely on fiscal numbers and ignored the potential for the deva-
stating effect this new cleanup plan would produce. He believed
the Bush administration's plan was "the best news for Hanford
since the signing of the original clean up agreement."99
Promises, however, are sometimes better in theory than in
practice. After evaluating USDOE's plan to accelerate cleanup at
Hanford, the Hanford Advisory Board declared that "[i]t appears
the plan may sacrifice quality and rigor for cleanup required by
current laws and regulations for the sake of expediency."' 0 While
the Bush administration declared billions of dollars could be saved
by completing the cleanup work sooner,' it failed to inform the
public of the detrimental and illegal practices it would employ to
reach its goal.
B. USDOE's "Incidental" Changes: High-Level and Low-Level
Waste
The Bush administration praised its own nuclear site reme-
diation plans for cost-effectiveness and risk reduction.10 2 USDOE
97 Craig Welch, Hanford Cleanup Still Needs Viable Plan: Leaky Tanks Present
Technical Challenge, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at B1.98 See id. The previous target date, however, was 2070. Id.
99 Id.
'oo Editorial, Energy Should Open Up About Hanford Cleanup, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 23,2002, at C2 (quoting the Hanford Advisory Board) [hereinafter Hanford
Cleanup].
'0' See NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 3; Welch, supra note 97.
102 See Press Release, Dept. of Energy, Department of Energy and Washington
State Agree to Pursue Accelerated Cleanup Strategy for Hanford Site (Mar. 6,
2002), at http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLICID=13047&BT_
CODE=PRPRESSRELEASES&TTCODE=PRESSRELEASE.
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and the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
commenced an initiative in February 2002 "to accelerate the
schedule and reduce the costs of cleaning up high-level and other
radioactive and hazardous waste, while focusing its resources on
reducing risks to human health and the environment at its
sites." °3 USDOE decided that not only would it ignore the
potential negative effects of an accelerated cleanup program at
Hanford, but it would also blatantly disregard the TPA agreement
it had previously entered into.
The TPA required that 99% of the 53 million gallons of HLW
occupying the outdated tanks at Hanford would be extracted.' 4
The low-level waste ("LLW") was given less strict requirements for
remediation. Unilaterally, USDOE decided that to "get rid of more
than 1 million gallons of high-level radioactive sludge .... [i]f
you're the U.S. Department of Energy, you simply call it low-level
radioactive sludge."0 5
The crux of USDOE's proposal was its attempt to reclassify
HLW and LLW and separate the two forms of radioactivity.'0 6
LLW is immobilized and stored at the Hanford Site close to the
surface of the ground, in containers such as vaults or canisters.
0 7
However, the regulations of NWPA and TPA require HLW to be
transported to a geological repository for disposal.' ° HLW is
103 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 1.
104 Hanford Cleanup, supra note 100. Vitrification of these wastes was to be
completed by 2028. Pollet, supra note 5, at 32.
105 Editorial, Nuke-and-Switch; Once Again, Feds Get Caught Trying to Dodge
Hanford Cleanup, COLUMBIAN, July 14, 2003, at C6 [hereinafter Nuke-and-
Switch].
106 See NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 3.
107 Id. at 9; see also Charles Pope, Inslee Raps Hanford Waste Plan: House
Endorses His Motion Against Reclassification, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 3, 2003, at B1.
108 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 8. HLW is waste containing radioactive
elements that release extremely hazardous radiation. Due to this radiation, the
waste has to be contained in isolation in a strong protective layer such as
concrete. "Low-level waste is . . . radioactive material that is not high-level
radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, or certain by-product
material .... Id. at 18 n.16.
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defined by NWPA as the "leftovers of reprocessing" spent nuclear
fuels.'0 9
Approximately 53 million gallons of HLW is stored in nearly
200 tanks beneath the ground at the Hanford Site." 0 What lies in
these tanks, however, is the subject of conflict between USDOE
and Washington. Citizens characterize the waste in the Hanford
tanks as a "deadly stew of radioactive leftovers, toxic chemicals
and who knows what else.""' Over ninety-eight percent of the tank
waste is liquid leftovers, which could be extracted from the tanks
for processing." 2 The conflict between Washington and USDOE
109 Matthew L. Wald, Energy Department Is Challenged Over Waste Disposal
Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at Al; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262 (D. Idaho 2003). The actual language used
by Congress to define HLW in NWPA is
(A) the highly radioactive material resulting from the repro-
cessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced
directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from
such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient
concentrations; and
(B) other highly radioactive material that the Commission, con-
sistent with existing law, determines by rule requires
permanent isolation.
42 U.S.C. §10101(12)(A) (2000).
110 Nuke-and-Switch, supra note 105; see also Pollet, supra note 5, at 29 ("The
most intensely radioactive High-Level Nuclear liquid wastes.., were discharged
into 149 Single Shell Tanks and 29 newer Double Shell Tanks. At least 68 of the
Single Shell Tanks have leaked over a million gallons.").
111Nuke-and-Switch, supra note 105.
112 Id.; see also Natural Res. Def Council, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
After frequent bombardments, the fission reaction becomes
inefficient and the rods are removed. Even so, the uranium and
plutonium pellets are not entirely spent, and contain a large
amount of energy potential. To extract the still-usable isotopes,
the pellets are dissolved in an acid bath. This reprocessing
procedure leaves highly radioactive particles suspended in an
acid chemical solution as a liquid waste. The acid is neutralized
and the liquid is placed in storage tanks. Over time, the
particles sink to the bottom of the tanks forming a sludge while
the liquid remains on top.
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arises from the more expensive task of determining how to treat
the waste at the bottom of the tanks.
113
USDOE has been attempting for years to redefine as
"incidental" the material at the bottom of Hanford tanks.
1 4
"Incidental" waste is treated as LLW; therefore, redefining the
sludge at the bottom of the Hanford tanks as incidental means that
it no longer has to be buried deep underground as HLW." 5 USDOE
requested that EPA declare the redefined incidental wastes as safe
enough to store and dispose of the wastes indefinitely. 1 6 USDOE's
goal is to reclassify ninety percent of the fifty-four million gallons
of waste as "incidental."
1 17
Environmental groups believe USDOE "intends to leave lite-
rally thousands of gallons of the highly radioactive sediments and
sludges at the bottom of the underground tanks, cover the waste
in place with concrete, and hope for the best.""8 These groups also
fear that the reclassification scheme will allow this "incidental"
waste, with the potential to be radioactive for tens of thousands of
years, to mobilize out of the tanks by rain or groundwater." 9 Al-
ready, certain parts of the Columbia River contain groundwater
that is over 1200 times the legal limit of contamination required
by federal drinking water standards. 2 °
USDOE's plan to redefine and "separate tank waste into high-
level waste and 'low-level' waste is unsound because it will result
in the shallow land disposal of millions of curies of long-lived
"
3 Nuke-and-Switch, supra note 105. After the liquid waste has been pumped
out, "what's left [is] a sort of deadly bathtub scum that ranges in consistency
from mayonnaise to rock salt." Id.
114 Wald, supra note 109.
115 Id.; see also NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 27.
116 NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 19, at 31. If EPA complies, the waste will stay
immobilized. Id.
117 Id. at 26.
11 Wald, supra note 109.
'1 Id. "More than one million gallons of toxic goo have leaked into ground water
that feeds the river." Welch, supra note 97.
120 Press Release, Protect Washington, Two Reports Show Need for 1-297 to Clean
Up Hanford (July 28, 2004), available at http://www.heartofamericanorthwest.
org/reportspubs/1297News-07-28-04.pdf.
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radioactivity."12' As of 1997, the anticipated amount of LLW was
close to seventy percent greater than the entire amount of HLW.1
22
USDOE, adhering to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
("NRC") Class C waste regulations, intended to dispose of the LLW
on the Hanford Site in shallow land burials.'23 However, Class C
waste can still emit significant quantities of radionuclides.
124
Therefore, USDOE blatantly ignores the effects that shallow burial
could have on the nearby Columbia River.
25
USDOE paints a very pretty picture of its accelerated cleanup
program. However, the plan fails to resolve or even consider the
problem of long-term HLW management, which could result in
more expensive remediation programs in the future. Attorney
General Christine Gregoire doubts USDOE's intentions.
Washington will not sit back and allow the Federal
government to declare the Hanford cleanup a success
by simply moving the goal line. That is not "acce-
lerated cleanup" by our standards. We have far too
much at stake to allow our legacy to be defined by
how much we leave behind. 126
As a result, USDOE's proposal for the Hanford tank re-
mediation is not instituting a protection measure to solve the
problem of long-term HLW management. Instead, the act of
burying Class C LLW in shallow land burials may be the foun-
dation for a much more expensive remediation in the future.
121 Fioravanti & Makhijani, supra note 39, at 16.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Attorney General Christine Gregoire, Oversight Hearing on the U.S. Dept. Of
Energy Envt'l Management (EM) Program's Accelerated Cleanup Initiative, and
Proposed Changes to EM's Science and Technology Program, Remarks to the
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (July 11, 2002).
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C. An Unfair Balance: Reducing Vitrification and Increased
"Closed" Tanks
If USDOE is able to reclassify deadly radioactive waste to
meet its own ulterior motives, then the Bush administration will
accomplish its goal to avoid vitrifying seventy-five percent of
the HLW at the Hanford Site.127 Under the TPA, all LLW should
be "glassified" and stored in a retrievable glass form. 2s However,
USDOE intends to bury this LLW permanently in shallow land-
fills, without glassifying the waste,'29 and using cement as the only
barrier to the waste because vitrification is a much more expen-
sive process."'
The Hanford Site uses the vitrification process in its separate
of waste into high-level and low-level. Of the available technologies
used in the cleanup programs, vitrification is the most expensive
but also the most effective.' 3' However, USDOE's Assistant Secre-
tary for Environmental Management, Jessie Roberson, stated in
November of 2001 that her highest priority in cutting costs for the
environmental budget was to "eliminate the need to vitrify at least
75 percent of the waste scheduled for vitrification.
" 132
D. Order 435.1
Order 435.1 was created in July of 1999 by USDOE as an
instructive manual of how to dispose and qualify HLW at the
127 Pollet, supra note 5, at 31.
12 RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 3.
129 Id. USDOE's plan "will tremendously increase both the amount of waste in
the landfills and their impact to groundwater; i.e., Technetium alone from the
tank wastes increases the contamination of groundwater by 20%." Id. Tech-
netium is not a waste material that USDOE wants included as HLW and will
not, therefore, be vitrified under its plan. Id.
.
3 Nuke-and-Switch, supra note 105.
131 Alvarez, supra note 14. Vitrification is a "complex process involving heavy
shielding and extensive remote handling that converts long-lived nuclear wastes
into glass logs for permanent geological disposal." Id.
132 Id.
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Hanford Site.'33 The order describes the process by which USDOE
can define waste as incidental, and deem the waste outside the
regulation requirements defined by NWPA.'34
Under Order 435.1, HLW is reclassified as incidental waste if
it meets the following criteria:
1) key radionuclides must be removed to the extent
technically and economically practical;
2) the waste must meet safety requirements com-
parable to the performance objectives set out in 10
C.F.R. part 61, Subpart C; and
(3) the waste must be managed in accordance with
the DOE's requirements for low-level waste as set
forth in Chapter IV of the Manual, provided the
waste is incorporated into a solid physical form that
does not exceed concentration limits for Class C low-
level waste set out in 10 C.F.R. § 61.55, or must meet
such alternative requirements for waste classification
and characterization as DOE may authorize.
135
As part of the Order, USDOE must first satisfy these con-
ditions, then obtain a technical review of the conclusions drawn
by USDOE from NRC, who can concur or not. If NRC concurs,
USDOE classifies the waste as "incidental."36
In an "Orwellian slight of hand,"37 USDOE wanted to redefine
over three quarters of its most dangerous radioactive waste by
describing this waste as "incidental,"38 which means it can be
combined with cement and buried in shallow holes or just left
alone. 39 USDOE wants to refer to this waste as "incidental" even
though the National Academy of Sciences stated that the hazards
133 Id.
134 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262 (D.
Idaho 2003).
135 Id.
136 Id.
117 Alvarez, supra note 14.
1389 d.
139 Id.
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at the Hanford Site "will persist for centuries, millennia, or
essentially forever."
140
E. Judicial Response to USDOE's Reclassification Scheme:
Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. v. Spencer
Abraham and United States
On July 2, 2003, the District of Idaho invalidated Order
435.1.141 The National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), the
Yakama Indian Nation, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe, and the
Idaho-based Snake River Alliance142 brought the cause of action
against Order 435.1.143 NWPA states that HLW is defined as:
(A) the highly radioactive material resulting from the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid
waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid
material derived from such liquid waste that contains
fission products in sufficient considerations; and
(B) other highly radioactive material that the Com-
mission, consistent with existing law, determines by
rules requires permanent isolation. 144
Order 435.1 describes the process by which USDOE can define
waste as incidental and therefore not subject itself to the regu-
lation requirements as defined by NWPA. 145 USDOE defines
incidental wastes as those that "do not warrant geologic repository
disposal because of their lack of long-term threats to the environ-
ment and man."'46 The threshold issue in the case was whether
140Id.
141 See generally Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D.
Idaho 2003).
142 Alvarez, supra note 14.
143 Natural Res. Def. Council, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. This case also involved
two other sites-the INEEL facility in Idaho and the Savannah River site in
South Carolina. Id. at 1262.
1 4Id. at 1262.
14 5 Id.
146 id.
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Congress had ever specifically addressed the question of how to
define different types of waste.'4 7 In NWPA, Congress defined
HLW and used the word "including" to illustrate the definition
given. United States District Judge B. Lynn Winmill stated that
"NWPA's definition of HLW considers both the source of the waste
and, in the case of solids derived from liquid waste, its hazard. It
is undisputed that the waste stored at Hanford, INEEL, and
Savannah River is highly radioactive and the result of repro-
cessing." 4 ' Judge Winmill ruled that USDOE could not "reclassify
these wastes through a 'whim' and must process them for geolo-
gical disposal."'4 9 She declared that Order 435.1 was not instituted
to allow USDOE to determine the presence of incidental waste, but
rather organized the test so that USDOE had complete control over
how to treat a particular waste.'
NRDC attorney Geoff Fettus stated that "[i]f you follow the
DOE's arguments to their logical conclusion, we might as well
dispose of the equivalent of several thousand tons of spent
commercial reactor fuel in unlined shallow burial near important
water supplies." 5' Soon after this ruling, on July 17, 2003, USDOE
Assistant Secretary Roberson requested that Congress overturn
the district court's decision.'52 In response, members of the
Washington State delegation went to the House floor, led by
Representative Jay Inslee of Washington's Fourth District, in
order to combat the Bush administration's attempt to reclassify
high-level nuclear waste. 53 State attorneys from Washington,
Idaho, Oregon, and South Carolina insisted that allowing the
reclassification system to be used would "give the Department [of
Energy] blanket discretion to exempt such wastes from long-
standing management and disposal requirements."'54 With a
147 Id. at 1264.
14 Natural Res. Def. Council, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
149 Alvarez, supra note 14.
150 Natural Res. Def. Council, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
151 Alvarez, supra note 14.
152 Id.
153 Alex Fryer, Washington Lawmakers Stop Bush From Reclassifying Nuclear
Waste, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at B1; see also Editorial, Playing Fair with
Nuclear Cleanup, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at D2.
154 Fryer, supra note 153.
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unanimous voice vote, the House voted in favor of Inslee's motion
demanding that the representatives of the House on the Energy
Legislation Conference Committee remove the Bush administra-
tion and USDOE's reclassification plan. 55
V. RESPONSE TO BUSH'S PLAN TO TRANSPORT HIGHLY
RADIOACTIVE PLUTONIUM WASTE TO HANFORD
A. Broken Promises
USDOE Secretary Abraham already promised Congress, in
2002, that the extended cost of waste disposal would weigh in all
decisions regarding disposal.'56 Yet Secretary Abraham has failed
to consider a proposal that offsite generators of hazardous waste
be charged by USDOE for the extensive, long-term costs of dispo-
sal.,5 ' Instead, Abraham charges these offsite generators barely
fifty percent of the cost of disposal.'5 8 Failing to charge these offsite
generators violates state hazardous waste laws that require fina-
ncial assistance for the monitoring and closure costs that disposal
sites incur.59
The full cost of importing waste must be recovered.
16
Additionally, Secretary Abraham and USDOE have failed to
investigate alternative locations to the Hanford Site for waste
155 Id.
156 RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 34.
15 7 Id.
5
' Id. "There is no doubt that charging [for] the fully burdened, long-term costs
[of disposal] has environmental benefits, including waste reduction, encou-
ragement of pretreatment and consideration of alternative regulated, lined
disposal facilities that do charge closure and monitoring fees." Id.
15 9 Id.
160 See id. at 18.
In 1999, USDOE charged offsite generators $14.05 per cubic foot
($495 per cubic meter) for LLW Category I disposed at Hanford,
whereas the cost of disposal (including both variable and fixed
costs) was $1,046 per cubic meter. This included no charges for
the long-term monitoring or closure of the burial grounds.
RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 18.
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disposal.' 6 ' However, the HANW Research Center has conducted
an extensive comparison. Research conclusively demonstrates that
in comparing USDOE's landfill alternatives, the most reasonable
course of action with the least environmental impact resides in a
lined, regulated landfill in Clive, Utah.'62 "[Olperated by 'En-
virocare of Utah,' [the landfill] has never released waste, has
leachate collection systems and both ground water and soil column
(vadose zone) monitoring that far exceed USDOE's low-level burial
grounds, and is not located above drinkable ground water."'63 As
a condition of Utah's landfill permit, disposal charges include the
costs of long-term monitoring and closure.'"
Despite the existence of the Utah landfill, USDOE still insists
on using the unlined soil trenches at Hanford for disposal. 65 The
Hanford trenches also
lack leachate collection; are not properly capped after
waste is dumped in them; have no independent regu-
latory oversight and quality assurance to prevent
illegal disposal of unknown or hazardous wastes; do
not have a legally compliant ground water and soil
column monitoring system; [and] are releasing hazar-
dous substances to [the environment].166
Finally, the "offsite generators pay less than 50% of the current
costs of disposal, as estimated by USDOE's own studies, and none
of the long-term, fully burdened costs of disposal for monitoring,
remediation, and closure."67
The Hanford Site already bears too much of the burden for the
storage of nuclear waste. 68 Almost 60% of the United States'
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 RD-HSWEIS, supra note 47, at 18.
167 Id.
168 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, BRIDGING THE GAP: HANFORD'S
"KNOWING ENDANGERMENT" 4 (Fall 2003), available at http'//www.whistleblower.
org/uploads/BridgeGapFall2003.pdf.
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defensive HLW, over 80% of USDOE's highly radioactive reactor
fuel, and more than 60% of USDOE's plutonium-contaminated
transuranic waste are already stored at Hanford.
169
In December of 2002, a deal was struck between USDOE and
the State of Washington in which Washington agreed not to block
the transportation of 170 barrels of waste from Ohio and Califor-
nia to the Hanford Site. 7 ' Washington believed that it was only
accepting this waste "temporarily, until the waste [could] be sent
to an underground salt mine in New Mexico for permanent
burial."' 7 ' Washington's main concern was USDOE's plans for
cleaning up the 78,000 barrels of waste that were already stored
in Hanford's trenches. 7 2
In exchange, USDOE promised to establish a time table by
March 1, 2003.173 Milestones were to be created and a seven-year
time table was supposed to outline the steps USDOE would utilize
to facilitate the disposal of the 78,000 barrels of waste at
Hanford. 74 USDOE and Washington agreed to formulate a
"compliance schedule for the retrieval designation, treatment, and
ultimate transport of this material for disposal at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a repository near Carlsbad, New
Mexico constructed specifically for the deep geological disposal of
transuranic waste." 71 USDOE was reluctant to set a timetable but
it did make an empty promise that for every barrel shipped to the
Hanford Site, two barrels from Hanford would be transported to
New Mexico for permanent burial. 7 6
Washington fulfilled its promise to USDOE, accepting appro-
ximately fifty barrels of waste from Ohio and California between
16 9 Id.
170 Craig Welch & Andrew Garber, State Sues Over Waste Shipments: Federal
Actions at Hanford are Targeted, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at B2.
171 Id.
172 See id.
173 Editorial, Energy's Broken Promise and a Ripe Lawsuit, SEATTLETIMES, Mar.
10, 2003, at B2 [hereinafter Energy's Broken Promise]; see also Editorial,
Following the Right Course in Hanford, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at B6.174 See Energy's Broken Promise, supra note 173.
175 Complaint, supra note 24, at 8.
176 Welch & Garber, supra note 170.
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December 2002 and March 2003.177 Not surprisingly, USDOE
failed to uphold its end of the agreement-no commitment to a
specific timetable to facilitate the disposal of waste at Hanford was
established. 17 USDOE also claimed it would not be subject to pe-
nalties if a deadline was not met. 179 The spokesman for GAP, Tom
Carpenter, stated that "[tirucking in off-site nuclear waste at Han-
ford is the Bush administration's signal that it intends Hanford to
become . . . another national nuclear-waste dump for time
immemorial."8 °
B. The Court Weighs In: Washington Takes On the Federal
Government
When USDOE again reneged on a promise it had made with
WDOE, the state finally could not take the deceit anymore. On
March 4, 2003, Washington filed a lawsuit against the federal
government seeking a permanent injunction against the tran-
sportation of waste to Hanford until USDOE made a serious
commitment to dealing with the 78,000 barrels of waste that
Hanford already stored.' The lawsuit was based on the idea that
Washington, under Superfund, had a right to stop shipments of
nuclear waste to the Hanford Site because it did not satisfy the
requisite environmental standards.
18 2
177Id.
17SId.
179 Washington Files Suit Against DOE to Halt TRU Shipments to Hanford, 42
ENERGY COMMUNITIES ALLIANCE BULLETIN, Mar. 2003, at 7, available at http://
www.energyca.org/PDF/March03Bulletin.pdf.
180 Welch & Garber, supra note 170.
.1 Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 24, at 2. Washington sought in its
complaint to prohibit USDOE "from shipping any additional such wastes to
Hanford until DOE 1) has fully complied with NEPA, 2) has undertaken a
decision making process based on current facts and circumstances, in full
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 3) has complied
with the HWMA." Id.
..
2 Annette Cary, Initiative 297 Foes Believe It Will Pass, TRI-CITY HERALD, Oct.
28, 2004. However, "[o]pponents of the initiative believe that forbidding the
federal government to bring waste to Hanford violates the Atomic Energy Act
and interstate commerce laws." Id.
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Essentially, the State claimed that USDOE "had not ade-
quately evaluated the options, effects and risks of handling the
imported waste at Hanford."" 3 U.S. District Court Judge Alan
McDonald temporarily banned waste imports because he did not
feel that USDOE had fully assessed the possible risks to Hanford
or Washington along the truck routes.' For example, 70,000
truckloads travel along Washington highways8 5 and in doing so
become "dirty bombs," threatening the lives of citizens all over
Washington.
8 6
Judge McDonald felt that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a
"serious question" regarding a 1997 nationwide study to compose
an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and whether USDOE
had a legal commitment to construct an EIS on the extent of the
risk of adding waste to Hanford.8 7
Under the Freedom of Information Act, HANW was able to
obtain documents that demonstrated:
"' Linda Ashton, Judge Pressed to Block Waste Shipments, SEATTLE TIMES, May
3, 2003, at B3.
1"4 Press Release, Heart of America Northwest, Federal Court Orders Halt to
Bush Administration Plan to Truck Highly Radioactive Plutonium Waste to
Hanford (May 13, 2003), available at http://www.heartofamericanorthwest.org/
newsreleases/newsrelease-may_13.doc [hereinafter Federal Court Orders
Halt].
18. Protect Washington-Stop Nuclear Waste Dumping: Initiative 297 (Heart of
America Northwest, Seattle, Wash.), 2003, at 2, available at http://www.
heartofamericanorthwest.org/protect-washington/protectwa-web.pdf
[hereinafter Protect Washington].
18 Paul Scukovsky, U.S. to Negotiate Faster Cleanup of Hanford Waste, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 17, 2002, at Al. The trucks would be like "dirty
bombs[,] . . .truckloads ... with extremely high radiation levels traveling
through Portland, the Columbia Gorge and mountain passes." Id. (quoting
Gerald Pollet); see also Marvin Resnikoff & Amanda Schneider, Unnecessary
Risks: Trucking the Nation's Radioactive Waste to Hanford (Heart of America
Northwest, Seattle, Wash.), Oct. 2004, available at http://www.heartofamerica
northwest.org/index-page.html (discussing the potential shipments to Hanford
and how dangerous the truck routes are when considering accidents and
economic impacts).
187 Federal Court Orders Halt, supra note 184.
837
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 29:807
USDOE officials attempted to keep their plans to
ship TRU to Hanford from being disclosed to citizens'
groups or the State; . . USDOE attempted to
piecemeal the decision to avoid disclosing that it
would ship very large amounts of TRU to Hanford
from many sites under plans approved by top USDOE
officials; . . .USDOE officials said that Hanford
would make receipt of Remote Handled TRU a
"higher priority" than Hanford Clean-Up Work....
Storage of TRU at Hanford was known by USDOE
officials to violate hazardous waste laws; and an
earthquake would release Plutonium from storage
buildings causing 30 to 200 offsite fatal cancers. 88
USDOE claimed in defense that while the waste was stored at
Hanford it was exempt from state and federal hazardous waste
laws.'89 According to Colleen French, a USDOE representative,
"it's irresponsible to drum up concerns about transportation of
waste." 9 ° Judge McDonald felt differently, stating that USDOE
was trying "to avoid disclosing and considering the total amount
of TRU waste it intends to ship to Hanford."' 9'
VI. DAVID AND GOLIATH: WASHINGTON'S CITIZENS GROUPS FIGHT
BACK
A. 1-297: Finding a Purpose
Washington's citizens realized that in order to protect their
own welfare and the welfare of their families, they could no longer
wait for their state's government and USDOE to negotiate another
"milestone" that will be ignored. Therefore, on June 9, 2003,
188 Id.
1"9 Welch & Garber, supra note 170.
190 Cary, supra note 182.
191 Federal Court Orders Halt, supra note 184.
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Protect Washington, a coalition of citizens groups, filed 1-297.192
The initiative's purpose is to:
prohibit sites at which mixed radioactive and ha-
zardous wastes have contaminated or threaten to
contaminate the environment, such as at the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation, from adding more waste that is
not generated from the cleanup of the site until such
waste on-site has been cleaned up and is stored,
treated, or disposed of in compliance with all state
and federal environment laws.'93
1-297 will be known as the Cleanup Priority Act ("CPA") if it
is passed into law9 . and added as a new chapter to Title 70 of the
Washington Revised Code.' 95 Though 1-297 would apply to many
of the facilities that exist in Washington, it was the decision by
USDOE to double the amount of waste at the Hanford Site that
prompted citizens groups to take action. 96 1-297 "is the ultimate
citizen sacrifice of time and effort to change state policy and to
require that laws be followed, when all other avenues have failed
. . . [i]t will make state policy the principle we all learned in
kindergarten: you can't keep adding to your mess until you've
cleaned up." 9 7 The initiative mainly prohibits importing additional
192 Press Release, Heart of America Northwest, Citizen Groups File Ballot
Initiative That Will Stop Shipments of Radioactive Nuclear Waste to Hanford
(June 9,2003), available at http://www.heartofamericanorthwest.org/PRCitizens
File030609.htm [hereinafter Ballot Initiative].
193 Initiative to the Leg. § 1. (Olympia, Wash., submitted Jan. 29,2004), available
at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i297.pdf [hereinafter I-
297].194 Id. § 12.
195 Id. § 14.
196 Ballot Initiative, supra note 192; see also Pollet, supra note 5, at 32 (ex-
plaining how the failure of federal and state departments to meet any of their
commitments regarding cleanup of the Hanford Site prompted public interest
groups to draft and distribute 1-297).
117 Pollet, supra note 5, at 32; see also Initiatives and Referendums, Washington
Voter, at http://www.washingtonvoter.org/default.asp?id=107 (last visited Mar.
31,2005) [hereinafter Washington Voter]. Under Washington's Constitution, any
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hazardous waste to a site like Hanford until the government is
able to fund and complete the remediation of the massive amounts
of radioactive and hazardous waste already present at the site.
98
Tom Carpenter, previously mentioned as the director of the GAP
nuclear whistleblower programs,'99 states, "[aiccepting more
dangerous radioactive waste from other states that will add to our
already over-capacity site, make our cleanup problems worse and
expose Washington citizens to unacceptable risks is just plain
wrong. We just won't accept it."200
B. 1-297. What Does It Promise to the Citizens of Washington?
First and foremost, 1-297 ensures that Washington will no
longer be used as USDOE's national radioactive waste dump.2 '
Specifically, 1-297 mandates that WDOE will utilize its authority
in the regulation of radioactive and nuclear mixed waste "to
prevent the import of waste from other sites across the country
until the waste at Hanford is cleaned up and stored, treated or
disposed of in compliance with all state and federal laws ... NO
ADDITIONAL WASTE UNTIL HANFORD IS CLEANED UP." 20
2
1-297 will also strengthen the enforcement capacity of TPA by
mandating that the first priority of each applicable site will be
cleaned up.2 °3
citizen with the right to vote can invoke the legislative powers of initiative and
referendum. Accordingly, on behalf of himself or a named organization, the
registered voter can propose to either establish a new state law or "amend or
repeal an existing statute." Id. Voters must sign the initiative after reviewing
its complete text. To be included on the ballot or reviewed by the legislature,
enough voters have to sign a minimum number "equal to eight percent of the
number of votes cast for the office of governor at the last regular gubernatorial
election." Id.
198 See Ballot Initiative, supra note 192.
199 National Radioactive Waste Dump, supra note 1.
200 Ballot Initiative, supra note 192.
201 See id.; National Radioactive Waste Dump, supra note 1.
202 Betty Tabbutt, League Board Votes to Support Initiative 297 Concerning
Mixed Radioactive and Hazardous Waste, 45 WASH. ST. VOTER 5 (2003),
available at http://www.lwvwa.org/voternewsletter/Vtr45-2fa1I03.pdf.
203 Protect Washington, supra note 185, at 2; see also 1-297, supra note 193,
§ 2(2) ("Cleanup is the state of Washington's top priority at sites with hazardous
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1-297 mandates that permits for mixed waste storage, treat-
ment, and disposal facilities, at which any mixed wastes have been
released into the environment, shall specify that the owner or
operator of the site will provide funding for an advisory board that
comprehensively represents the public. 20 4 1-297 also provides a
definition of "mixed waste":
any hazardous substance or dangerous or extremely
hazardous waste that contains both a nonradioactive
hazardous component and a radioactive component,
including any such substances that have been re-
leased to the environment, or pose a threat of future
release, in a manner that may expose persons or the
environment to either the radioactive or radioactive
hazardous substances.2°5
This definition of mixed waste is included to ensure that the
cumulative risks associated with mixed wastes stored at Hanford
will be scrutinized.2 6 Mixed wastes are further discouraged from
being stored at the Hanford Site through 1-297's creation and
implementation of a mixed waste surcharge." ' The mixed waste
surcharge will be incurred, in addition to an already established
service charge, by applicants or permit holders for mixed waste
facilities in Washington.2 s The money received from the mixed
waste contamination that threatens our rivers, ground water, environment, and
health. Adding more waste to contaminated sites undermines the cleanup of
those sites.").
204 1-297, supra note 193, § 9(1).
205 Id. § 3(9) (emphasis added).
206 Id.
207 Id. § 3(10).
208 Id. § 9(4)(b).
This mixed waste surcharge shall be no less than fifteen one-
hundredths of one percent of the first two hundred million
dollars of annual site budget for all related clean-up activities,
of which five one hundredths of one percent shall be available
for grants to local government. The mixed waste surcharge for
public and local government participation grants shall be five
one-hundredths of one percent of the portion of any estimated
841
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV. [Vol. 29:807
waste surcharge will be deposited in a state toxics control ac-
count. 20 9 From this account, WDOE will issue local government
and public participation grants to be used for "(i) assistance in
public review of mixed waste permit, closure, and cleanup de-
cisions; and, (ii) review of, and public comment on, site budgets,
compliance costs and funding priorities."210
As a part of CPA, the unlined trenches will no longer be used
to store mixed LLW. 211 The State of Washington already prohibits
the addition of waste to unlined trenches containing mixed
radioactive and hazardous wastes.212 However, USDOE has con-
sistently ignored state law, believing it is "exempt from regulation
of its deadly radioactive wastes being dumped in unlined soil
trenches (some of which are longer than 3 football fields)."213
In locations where the disposal of mixed waste is reasonably
perceived by WDOE to have occurred, Section Six of 1-297
expressly orders WDOE to contact site owners and operators of
these landfills and waste storage facilities that have unlined soil
trenches within sixty days of the commencement of CPA.21 4 In
doing so, WDOE is to order these site owners or operators to first
desist from the disposal of any waste in these unlined trenches
within thirty days of WDOE's order.21 5 The site owners and
operators are also required to begin an inquiry into the actual
components of the unlined trenches, investigating all potentially
hazardous materials present.2"6 After identifying the substances in
the unlined trenches, the occurrence or potential occurrence of a
annual site clean-up budget exceeding two hundred million
dollars.
Id.
209 1-297, supra note 193, § 9(4)(b).
21o Id. § 9(4)(a).
211 Tabbutt, supra note 202, at 5.
212 See 1-297, supra note 193, § 2(5)(b).
213 Protect Washington, supra note 185, at 2; see also Ballot Initiative, supra note
192. USDOE's indifference resulted in "a 180 square-mile underground lake of
lethal radioactive water [that] threatens the Columbia River and drinking water
sources." Id.
214 1-297, supra note 193, § 6(1)(a).
215 Id. § 6(1)(a)(i).
216 Id. § 6(1)(a)(ii).
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release of hazardous materials must also be investigated. 217 "A
plan for waste retrieval, treatment, closure, and monitoring for the
unlined soil trenches" must also be created where the guidelines
for a schedule are based on anticipated leakage of waste.218 Finally,
a ground water and soil column oversight system must be
established within two years of WDOE's order to cease disposal in
all unlined trenches.219 Section Six of 1-297 also includes a
provision that makes the expansion of the trenches illegal where
"there is a reasonable basis to believe mixed or hazardous wastes
are buried or stored that have not been fully characterized to
conclusively determine that no mixed or hazardous wastes are
present."
221
C. Going to the Polls
In Washington, an initiative like 1-297 is submitted to' the
legislature for its regular session in January. 22' Voters submitted
1-297 for the January 2004 session, allowing the legislature to
proceed with one of three options.222 First, the legislature could
have adopted 1-297, whereby it would become the Cleanup Priority
Act without being sent to the ballot.223 Additionally, the legislature
could have either ignored or rejected 1-297, forcing it to appear as
a measure on the November election's general ballot.224 The third
option was for the legislature to propose an "alternative version"
of 1-297, whereby both proposals would be present on the Nove-
mber 2004 ballot.225
217 Id. § 6(1)(a)(iii).
218 Id. § 6(1)(a)(iv).
219 Id. § 6(1)(a)(v).
220 1-297, supra note 193, § 6(b)(2)(a).
221 Washington Voter, supra note 197.
222 Press Release, Washington Secretary of State, Initiative to the Legislature
297 Certified (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/
news.aspx?newsjid=232 [hereinafter Initiative Certified].2 23 Id.; see also Washington Voter, supra note 197 ("[Tjhe measure then becomes
a law which cannot be amended for two years.").
224 Initiative Certified, supra note 222.
225 Id.
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The legislature did not act on 1-297.226 However, the citizens
groups who submitted 1-297 preferred the decision to be made by
the people anyway.227 The official summary of 1-297 on the
November ballot was:
This measure would establish additional require-
ments for regulating mixed waste (radioactive and
nonradioactive hazardous substances) sites, such as
the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. The measure
would set standards for cleanup and granting
permits, would prohibit waste disposal in unlined soil
trenches, and require cleanup of tank leaks. Permits
would not allow adding more wastes to facilities until
existing contamination was cleaned up. Additional
public participation would be provided and enforce-
ment through citizen lawsuits would be authorized.228
There was a concern, however, that Hanford contractors and
USDOE would try to confuse Washington voters by passing an
alternative to 1-297.229 Obviously, the number of people who read
and signed 1-297 had not swayed USDOE from trying to deceive
the public.
The Bush administration was also no longer able to dodge the
bullet of Hanford Site remediation. Washington State Senator
Adam Kline stated that 1-297 had such a large impact on politics
that every time President Bush campaigned in the Northwest, he
was questioned about
226 Chris Mulick, Hanford Cleanup Advocates Gather 282,000 Signatures, TRI-
CITY HERALD, Jan. 3, 2004 ("'I'm somewhat embarrassed some of our legislators
have not endorsed this [I-297]' said state Sen. Adam Kline, a Seattle Democrat
who argued that the measure would boost the Tri-City economy.").
227 National Radioactive Waste Dump, supra note 1 (noting the potential impact
of 1-297 on the 2004 presidential election in Washington and Oregon).
228 State Vote 2004: Election Profile, National Conference of State Legislatures,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfm?yearsel=2004&state
sel=WA (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
229 Rebecca Gold, Signatures Submitted to Halt Hanford Nuclear Shipments,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 3, 2004.
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why he wants to use our region as a national
radioactive waste dump. Where candidates stand on
Initiative 297 brings home to people the impact of the
choices they make on Election Day .... Voters see
the real impact to their families when they think of
70,000 truckloads of radioactive waste heading
through our communities.23 °
D. Voters Say "Yes" to 1-297 and USDOE Fights Back
Senator Kline was right-the voters of Washington ignored
the empty promises of the Bush administration in November 2004
and voted overwhelmingly in favor of 1-297; all but two counties in
Washington voted to pass 1-297 into law.231 1-297 was passed with
1,812,581 votes, representing 69.09% of all those who voted.232
Gerald Pollet, the chief sponsor of 1-297 and the Executive Director
of HANW, stated that the passage of 1-297 shows that "[i]t's clear
that the rule of the people of the state of Washington is that
Hanford needs to be cleaned up before more waste can be dumped
there."233
However, the federal government was not about to implement
the wishes of Washington's citizens without a fight. It has filed a
lawsuit against the state, alleging that CPA (formerly 1-297), was
unconstitutional and preempted by federal law.234 As such, there
has been no implementation of CPA since it was enacted as law in
December 2004.235 However, Judge McDonald declared that the
230 National Radioactive Waste, supra note 1.
231 Washington State 2004 General Elections, Washington Secretary of State, at
http:/vote.wa.gov/general/measures.aspx?a=297 (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (show-
ing the election results for 1-297 by county).
232 Id.
233 Future of Hanford Initiative in Doubt Despite Voters'Approval (KOMO 1000
News, Seattle, Wash.), Nov. 3,2004, at http://www.komotv.com/news/story.asp?
ID=33785.214 Annette Cary, Judge Says Hanford Cleanup Initiative Will Not Be Enforced,
TRI-CITY HERALD, Feb. 9, 2005.235 Id.
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decision about 1-297 will be made by Washington's Supreme Court,
rather than a federal court, 236 stating that
[tihis court believes the CPA is susceptible of an
interpretation that would avoid or substantially mo-
dify the federal constitutional challenge. Because of
its very recent enactment, the CPA has not been sub-
ject to any interpretation by the courts of the State of
Washington. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested
that the Washington Supreme Court consider and
answer (the questions on the meaning of the Act
proposed by the Washington Attorney General).23 7
The decision by Judge McDonald "is a significant victory for
the voters of Washington State, a significant victory for Hanford
Clean-Up, and a significant victory for the principle that a state's
highest court should decide what the state's voters intended when
they pass an initiative."238 Despite Washington's overwhelming
support of CPA, its fate remains unknown for the time being.
CONCLUSION: WHO'S GOT THE POWER?
1-297, now enacted as law, prevents the federal government
from using the Hanford Site as a national radioactive waste dump.
As the November general election results demonstrate, the citizens
of the State of Washington will no longer be silenced with empty
promises from USDOE about cleanup and remediation at the
Hanford Site. Though the federal government is trying to prevent
the implementation of CPA, the citizens of Washington will not be
silenced again.
238 Order Granting Motion to Certify, Inter Alia, No. CV-04-5128-AAM, United
States v. Hoffman et al. (E.D.C. Wash. Feb. 8, 2005).
237 Press Release, Heart of America Northwest, Washington Supreme Court Will
Decide Meaning of Initiative 297, Not a Federal Court (Feb. 8, 2005), available
at http://www.hoanw.orgpdf/020805.pdf.
2
. Id. (quoting Gerald Pollet, the chair of the Yes on 1-297: Protect Washington
Committee).
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CPA's inclusion of mandatory public oversight will make the
owners and operators of places like the Hanford Site accountable,
both financially and operationally, for any negligence in the
treatment or storage of mixed wastes-past, present, or future.
With the approval of 1-297, power is restored to Washington's
citizens, as CPA "puts control back into the hands of the people of
Washington to stop more deadly nuclear waste shipments to
Hanford and protect our communities and our children from more
harm."239 CPA will finally provide Washington's citizens with the
security of knowing that each time they take a shower, drink a
glass of water, or simply breathe, they are not being contaminated
by the mess left behind by the United States government.
239 Ballot Initiative, supra note 192.
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